Federalist Paper No. 10 :
1. No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.
2. Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
- Madison explains how a republic will have the ability to protect the people form specific radical ideals that are looking for their own self interest while allowing for compromise between groups of differing ideas. He explains that while the power of the republic may be in one place, their are many benefits that come out of this form of government. Not only is it a better alternative to any other possible ways of governing the new nation, but it also allows for every group to have a voice without fear of oppression. Within the system itself, there is no way for a single group to stand above the others and dictate what can be spoken and done. At the same time, because so many voices are allowed to be heard, the safety of the people is ensured as more ideas can be considered with more people thinking. Furthermore, the government itself is not a blinded group trying to do whatever everyone says. Instead, it looks out not for the powerful and the greedy, but for what is best for everyone and what is truly is the most just for the people of it's country.
Federalist Paper No. 51 :
1. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.
- This passage clearly shows why the American form of government works simply because it shows how the government is a self regulating system. It explains how there must be checks on the government and that the best check on the government are the people itself. By allowing this to occWur within the government, the people are giving the government the ability to govern them while giving the government the ability to control itself from getting out of hand. By doing so, there will be no outrageously corrupt ruler or a system that doesn't protect it's people. With a dependence on the people, the government is unable to tailor itself to the ideals of a single individual, but of the population as a whole. This distribution of power is essentially, the a means to distribute power as well as ensuring that not a single group of people end up making all of the decisions for the people regardless of what they think. In doing so, the voice of the people are protected because they are a part of the system and the government can protect the people because it has been given the authority by it's general population.
2. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself.
- Within this section of the Federalist Papers, a clear distinction regarding the form of government that is to be but in place is drawn. The writers explain how this new government embraces all of the ideals of the people, allowing there to never be one specific power that is always going to win nor a specific group that dictates the mindset of the people. Allowing a overarching government ensures a larger population and in turn, a larger group of mindsets. With this in place, the government frees itself from the expectations of the majority as the majority can not harm minorities and instead, governs through justice and what it the best for the general population. In doing so, possible restrictions are over turned as the government itself has the ability to ensure that it's purpose is achieved. By unbinding the government from the will of society as a whole, the government is allowed to view the bigger picture in a conflict instead of being forced to decided off of one puzzle piece.
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