Why does the American form of government work?

Why does the American form of government work?

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

To prevent the inherent evils of a true democracy, a republic is proposed.  The republic form of government utilizes representatives of the people to act as the legislature in the government.  This way, the whims of the masses may be moderated by the wiseness of the representatives, and in this fashion the American form of government can survive and function properly while retaining the principles of democracy.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

Outlined here is the idea that as the voting population grows larger and larger, those unworthy of holding office have less and less chance to succeed, and those who possess the necessary skills and merit are likely to win.  This trend helps the American government function, as the American people as a whole are able to make wiser decisions than American individuals.  That being said, this principle is contradicted in recent events...

In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.

Most important in this passage is the idea of dividing federal power among branches of government, namely the legislative, judicial and executive branches.  This principle sets up checks and balances on every branch, resulting in no branch being able to gain significant power and dominate government.  This idea is essential to proceedings of government today, and is also cause for much conflict within the federal government.

A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.

The American government’s legislative body, Congress, is an important part of federal power.  This body creates the laws of the country, and as such wields considerable power.  In order to prevent this body from growing too powerful is to divide Congress into two branches, the House of Representatives and the House of the Senate.  This founding principle helps the American government function properly.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp