Why does the American form of Government work?

Federalist Article #10 (Madison):

"As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government."

This quote is saying that mankind naturally disagrees with one another. He is right -- governments that suppress difference of opinions never last long. In this excerpt, Madison argues that a good government's priority is to protect everyone's core interests, mainly property and the ability to climb the social ladder. With varying interests, the people will divide into factions, e.g. Democrats and Republicans. It is the government's responsibility to protect all factions and beliefs, even if they oppose one another.

"In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters."

Here, Madison acknowledges the concept of corruption when contrasting the notion of having a small or large republic. By having a large number of citizens elect their representatives, there is a greater chance that the elected representative will have no choice but to obey the law, or else he may face a larger scale revolution. Because such a number of people vote for a select amount of representatives, the government will most likely "possess the most attractive merit" for the people's choice. In essence, the more people vote, the less corruption there is (ideally).

Federalist Article #51 (Madison):

"In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another... Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted."

Madison argues that the three-branch form of government must not be dependent on each other (or else it may as well be a 1 branched system!). Each branch should have a "will of its own". He argues that there must be a separation of powers. The separation of powers is one of the biggest and most important pieces to the American government, and that is another key to why it works today. A 1-branch government is dictatorship; 2 branches can still be easily corrupted, but a 3-branch government creates a triangular equilibrium of power, where no one branch may surpass another. To keep this equilibrium, one branch should mainly avoid appointing officers to other branches, with a few exceptions highlighted later in Madison's essay. With 3 independent branches comes a balance and separation of power, and a separation of power is a shield of corruption.

The people's will can remain the top priority for all three branches.

"There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority."

Madison addresses the idea of corruption once again, but this time he is addressing monarchical corruption as opposed to elected representatives' corruption. In this quote, he mentions how if lawmakers are disconnected from the majority, as in monarchies, the people can be easily oppressed by the law, for the lawmakers can benefit off the people's misery. The lawmakers still have power over the people, but they are dependent on the people's success and happiness in order for them to remain in power and for their government to be strong. Additionally, the people cannot form unjust majorities as well, for there are so many social, economic, and racial classes with different interests that it would be all but impossible to band together and control the rest of the population in some way.

Madison reiterates the dominance of the majority's will over all else in Federalist Paper No. 51.